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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE 0. NEWTON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH and THE 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMIS-
SION, Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
ll465 
This matter arises out of a collision between a motor 
vehicle being driven by the appellant and a truck 
owned by the State of Utah, being driven by an em-
ployee of the State Highway Department. 
1 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY 
LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, pre-
siding, entered judgment in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of 
the District Court for error of law, and the case re-
manded to the District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 30th day of December, 1966, at approxi-
mately I :10 a.m., at the intersection of 9th South and 
State Streets, Salt Lake City, Utah, a Ford Ranchero 
vehicle being driven by appellant collided with a 1965 
International truck owned by the State of Utah and 
driven by one Chauncey Eugene Kennedy, an employee 
of the State Road Commission. Appellant's vehicle 
wa~ travelling west on 9th South. The street was icy 
and slushy from an earlier snow fall. The appellee's 
vehicle was travelling east on 9th South and stopped 
at the semaphore at the intersection of 9th Sou'th and 
State Street in the middle lane of traffic and not in 
the left turn holding lane. The driver of appellee's 
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vehicle signaled for a left turn to go north on State 
Street. When the light changed to green he proceeded 
into the intersection and swung wide so that he would 
be in the outside lane of traffic when the turn was 
completed. According to his tesimony there was a car 
waiting to turn left to go south on State Street which 
stopped to allow him to proceed. This driver, if he 
existed at all, was never found by either party nor 
any of the investigators. He further states that one 
or possibly two cars went through the intersection going 
west and he waited for them to clear the intersection. 
He then commenced his left turn and heard the col-
lision. He tes'tified that at no time did he see the appel-
lant's vehicle before the collision (R-172), in fact, did 
not see it until he got out of his truck and walked 
to the right side of his vehicle (R-175). The appellant 
had been travelling west on 9th South from 485 East 
9th South, had stopped for the light at 2nd East and 
9th South and then proceeded west approaching the 
intersection of 9th South and State. He was travelling 
approximately 15, 16, or 17 miles per hour and had 
his car in second gear (R-188, 193). There was no 
evidence to the contrary. He first noticed the appellee's 
vehicle stopped at the intersection, he was approxi-
mately 225 feet from the intersection which was ap-
proximately the same time as the light changed from 
red to green for the ea~t-west traffic on 9th South. As 
he approached the intersection he slowed down a bit 
and when he was approximately 20 feet from the inter-
section he next observed appellee' s truck directly in 
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front of him. He immediatley looked to his right and 
turned sharply while applying his brakes. The left 
front of his vehicle struck the right front fender of 
the truck. Appellant testified that there were no cars 
in front of him going through the intersection and no 
others going north or south. The appellant first testi-
fied that he estimated the distances from the inter-
section when the semaphore turned green at between 
100 and 150 feet, right on the west edge of Don Carlos 
Drive-in parking lot. However, upon returned to the 
scene and measuring the distance to the parking lot 
he changed his testimony to the distance of approxi-
mately 225 feet from the intersection. Appellant lost 
one eye, suffered a broken ankle and other injuries, ' 
and brought suit under the governmental immunity 
act of Utah. Upon the above facts the court found 
appellant solely liable and absolved the driver of the 
state truck of any negligence, and denied appellant's 
motion for a new trial. 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT, IN REVIE,iVING 
THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE, MUST 
VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN A LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT AND 
ALL REASONABLE INTENDMENTS MUST 
BE INDULGED IN FAVOR OF REVERSING 
RATHER THAN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
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It is well settled in the law that the Supreme Court 
when reviewing on appeal a judgment of the District 
Court will view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the winning party and that the Supreme Court will 
affirm rather than deny if in doing so the conclusion 
can be based upon any logical reason. Rasmussen, et al, 
v. Davis, 1 U.2d 96, 262 P.2d 488 (1953); Smit/i v. 
Gallegos, 16 U.2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965). How-
ever, in cases such as the instant case wherein the trial 
judge entered a verdict and judgment of non-suit or 
no cause of action, the courts have uniformly held that 
in reviewing a judgment of no cause of action the 
evidence must be viewed and reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plain-
tiff. Raymond v. Union Pac. Railroad Co., 113 U. 
26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948); Knox v. Snow, 119 U. 522, 
229 P.2d 874 (1951). 
The courts of the State of California have held, 
as the courts of Utah have, regarding the viewing of 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff 
in cases such as this. In Reynolds v. National Gas 
Equipment., 7 Cal Rptr 879 (Cal, 1960) the court said: 
"On appeal for non-suit all reasonable intend-
ments must be indulged in favor of reversing, 
and judgment can be supported only if, giving 
plaintiff's evidence fully prima facie value and 
indulaing in everv reasonable inference that can 
be d~'lwn theref;om and with all conflicts re-
solved in his favor, the result is a determination 
that there is no substantial evidence to support 
a judgment for the plaintiff." 
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See also: Turner v. Ralph N. Parson Co., 117 Cal App 
2d 109, 254 p J 2d 970 ( 1953). 
The Utah Court in Malstrom v. Olsen, 400 P.2d 
209, 16 U.2d 316 (1965), said: 
"We reverse non-suit judgments if there is 
a reasonable basis in the evidence and the infer-
ences therefrom when considered n a light most 
favorable to the losing party (plaintiff) for a 
judgment in her favor." 
See also: T¥ilkerson v. Stephens, 403 P.2d 31, 16 U.2d 
424 (1965), and Wightman v. Fuel Supply, 302 
P .2d 471, 5 U.2d 373 ( 1956). 
The evidence shows that the appellant was not 
negligent in any manner whatsoever. The only tes-
timony as to the speed of appellant was his own 
statement that he might have been going 16 or 17 
miles per hour and slowed up prior to entering the 
intersection. (R-188, 193) There was likewise no 
evidence that the appellant was guilty of improper 
lookout. The evidence shows that the appellant ob-
served the appellee' s truck stopped at the intersec-
tion making a left turn, and proceeded into the inter-
section. Any conflicts in the evidence must be disre-
garded and the evidence must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the appellant. In Taylor v. Secony-Mobile 
Oil Co., 51 Cal Rptr, 764 (Calif, 1966), the court 
stated: 
"In reviewing the record on appeal from judg-
ment entered on order granting motion for non-
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suit conflicts in evidence must be disregarded. 
Plaintiff's evidence must be given all value to 
which it is legally entitled, every legitimate in-
ference which may be drawn from the evidence 
must be indulged in favor of the plaintiff, and 
to support the judgment the court must con-
clude there is evidence of substantiality to sup-
port a verdict in favor of plaintiff if such verdict 
were given." (Emphasis ours) 
We submit in view of the foregoing authorities that 
this court must view the evidence in a light most favor-
able to the plaintiff and must engage in all inferences 
which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND THE DRIVER OF APPELLEE'S VE-
HICLE NEGLIGENT AS A :MATTER OF 
LA,V", AND SUCH ERROR RESULTED IN 
PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT. 
(A) The driver of appellee's truck, Mr. Chauncey 
Eugene Kennedy, testified that he started into the 
intersection at 9th South and State, observed at least 
one other car stopped, allowed several cars to pass in 
front of him, and then proceeded with his left turn. 
(R-124) The duty of a driver intending to make a 
left hand turn within an intersectoin is found in 41-
6-73 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which 
reads as follows: 
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"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection 
intending to turn to the left shall yield the right 
of way to any vehicle approaching from the oppo-
cite direction which is within the intersection or 
so close thereto as to constitute an immediate , 
hazard." · 
The case of Smith v. Gallegos, 16 U.2d 344, 400 
P.2d 570 ( 1965), amply shows that the foregoing sec-
tion of the Utah Code places upon the person making 
the left turn a greater duty of care. The Court in Smith, 
1 
said at page 571: 
"The addition of the language just quoted 
clearly places a greater duty on the left turner 
in that he must yield not only to the approach-
ing vehicles close enough to constitute a hazard 
prior to beginning his turn, but also to vehicles 
which will constitute a hazard 'during the time 
he is moving within the intersection' which in-
cludes the time it is necessary for him to com-
plete his turn." 
In the instant case Mr. Kennedy had the duty to 
yield to all vehicles approaching close enough to con-
stitute a hazard prior to beginning his turn. He like-
wise had the duty to yield to other vehicles which were 
so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Mr. 
Newton's vehicle was so close as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard as evidenced by the fact of the collision, 
thus Mr. Kennedy was guilty of statutory negligence 
in that he violated Section 41-6-73, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended. 
(B) Mr. Kennedy from his own testimony clearly 
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started his left turn from a position straddling the 
center lane and the left turn lane going east on 9th 
South. (R-170, 171) 
There are two sections of the Utah Code which set 
out the lanes and the positions in lanes which drivers 
must assume before proceeding. Section 41-6-61 (a), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, states: 
"A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as prac-
tical entirely within a single lane and shall not 
be moved from such lane until the driver has 
first ascertained that such movement can be made 
with safety." 
and Section 41-6-66 (b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, reads as follows: 
"At any intersection where traffic is permitted 
to move in both directions on each roadway enter-
ing the intersection, an approach for a left turn 
shall be made in that portion of the right haH 
of the roadway nearest the center line thereof 
and by passing to the right of such center line 
where it enters the intersection and after enter-
ing the intersection the left turn shall be made 
so as to leave the intersection to the right of 
the centerline of the roadway being entered. 
Whenever practicable the left turn shall be 
made in that portion of the intersection to the 
left of the center line of the intersection." 
The evidence amply shows that Mr. Kennedy vio-
lated both of these provisions of the traffic rules an<l 
regulations and therefore was once again guilty of stat-
utory negligence. 
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( C) A driver has a duty to see what there is to 
be seen. Spackman v. Carson, 117 U. 390, 216 P.2d 640 
(1950); and Edmwnds v. Germer, 12 U.2d 215, 364 
P.2d 1015 (1961). From the record it is clear that Mr. 
Kennedy did not see the appellant's vehicle. (R-172) 
In fact he stated that he never saw the vehicle until 
he got out of the truck. (R-174) 
Mr. Kennedy saw one car stopped at the inter-
section and allowed one more to pass in front of him 
before completing his turn. (R-169) It is apparent 
from the fact of the collision that Mr. Kennedy could 
have seen appellant's vehicle if he would have looked. 
The vehicle was there and so close as to constitute an 
immediate hazard. Further the appellant was not 
speeding but in fact was doing less than the posted 
limit. (R-188) There was testimony to the effect that 
Mr. Kennedy had worked many hours that day with 
little or no sleep. This writer can only surmise as one 
who has done this very thing that after many hours 
a person's vision is not as clear, hi~ reflexes not as sharp, 
and his thinking less than what it should be when 
opera ting a vehicle. 
A Fortiori that the record is resplendent with 
evidence to show that Mr. Kennedy failed to keep a 
proper lookout which is yet another basis for finding 
negligence on his part. 
Appellant submits from the foregoing that there 
are at least three theories upon which the trial court 
could have and should have found negligence on the 
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part of Mr. Kennedy. All these factors when taken 
together can lead to but one conclusion, and that is that 
Mr. Kennedy was negligent and that this negligence 
was the sole and proximate cause of the accident. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE UPON WHICH 
THE COURT COULD BASE ITS FINDINGS 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT 
OR THAT ANY ACTION ON THE PART OF 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
signed by the trial judge and entered in the record state 
in effect that the appellant failed to maintain proper 
lookout and travelled at an excessive rate of speed. A 
reading of the transcript shows that without any doubt 
no one except the appellant was able to testify as to 
the approximate speed of the appellant. The driver of 
the State vehicle did not even see the appellant. Appel-
lant testified that he had been going 15, 16 or 17 miles 
per hour prior to the intersection and even slowed upon 
approaching the intersection. (R-188 and 193) There 
is no other evidence in the record and none other was 
even offered which would show the speed of the appel-
lant's vehicle. Appellant submits that on this evidence 
the court could not find excessive speed on the part 
of the appellant. The burden was upon the defendant 
to show the appellant's speed. A finding of fact as 
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entered in this case could not be based upon mere spec-
ulation or conjecture but only upon a preponderance 
of the evidence. In the case of Rich v. Eldridge, 106 
N.J.L. 181, 147 A. 384, the court held in effect that a 
car travelling 12 to 15 miles per hour would only justify 
a finding of 12 miles per hour. Applying this prin<.'.iple 
to the case at hand from the evidence that appellaut 
was travelling 15, 16 or 17 miles an hour, it follows 
that it is just as likely that he was going 15 miles per 
hour which is substantially under the posted speed 
limit and a speed which we would submit is reasonable 
and proper in light of the circumstances on the night 
in question. For the trial judge to make such a finding 
of speed upon mere speculation or conjecture is not 
proper. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in the case of 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U.2d 16, 268 P.2d 968, at page 
988: 
"A choice of probabilities does not meet this 
requirement. It creates only a basis for conjec-
ture on which a verdict of the jury cannot stand." 
Further there is nothing in the record which would 
show that the 15 miles per hour speed of the appellant's 
vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident. '"re 
submit that this is exactly what the trial judge found 
when he stated his findings orally in open court. 
"THE COURT: Mr. Newton has been ablr 
represented. The Court appreciates the help of 
counsel for the State in this matter. It is the find-
12 
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ing of the Court that the evidence clearly estab-
lishes negligence on the part of the plaintiff 
in failing to keep appropriate lookout under 
these circumstainces and as a result it is the 
duty of the Court to find and return a judgment 
of no cause of action for the plaintiff." 
Record 247 
The only evidence of the record on the point of im-
proper lookout is the statement of the appellant that 
he had observed the truck stopped at the intersection 
preparing to make a left turn and then he had proceed-
ed into the intersection. He at first had testified that 
he had observed this vehicle approximately 150 feet 
from the intersection, but later had changed his testi-
mony to approximately 225 feet from the intersection 
which would be approximately the same time the sema-
phore changed from red to green for the east-west 
traffic on 9th South. He did not keep a direct eye on 
the appellee's vehicle, but rather watched the other 
traffic in the area. He did not directly see 'the appellee' s 
vehicle until he was approximately 20 feet from him, 
and directly in his line of travel. The appellant was 
aware of the presence of the appellee' s vehicle but the 
appellant likewise had to give some attention to the 
management of his own vehicle and to other traffic 
on the highway. He could not become absorbed in the 
detail of what the appellee' s vehicle was doing. The 
standard of care to be exacted from a plaintiff in re-
gards to observance is set forth in a case of Peterson 
'V. Neilson, 9 U.2d 302, 343 P.2d 731, wherein the court 
at page 733 said: 
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"It is not to be regarded as within the stand-
ard of due care to require her (plaintiff), from 
the distance she was away, to observe where the 
defendant was looking as he sat inside the cab 
of his truck; nor was she bound to suspect that 
he had not looked to the north and had seen 
her approach; nor to anticipate that he would 
proceed upon the highway without again looking 
north." 
The plaintiff in this case was not required to ascer- , 
tain from his own senses what the driver of the appellee's 
vehicle was thinking about doing; he was not required 
to anticipate that the driver of defendant's vehicle 
would without any prior warning make a left turn in 
front of the appellant's vehicle. The appellant was at > 
least within 225 feet from the intersection when the light 
changed, travelling through an intersection with a 
semaphore that was green, thus appellant could assume 
that he had the right of way and that the driver of the 
appellee's vehicle would remain stopped and afford 
him the right of way. There is nothing in the record ; 
which would indicate that the driver of the appellee's 
vehicle did anything that would warn the appellant of 
his intention to commence his left turn in front of the 
appellant's vehicle. 
'Ve must remember that as the appellant approached 
this intersection in addition to the street upon which he 
was travelling there were three other streets intersecting 
at this point. He must give attention to each of these 
streets as well as to the intersection. All of his attention 
could not very well or very safely have been focused on 
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any one at any given instance. In the case of Martin v. 
Stephens, 121 U. 484, 243 P.2d 747, the Utah Supreme 
Court, in quoting from the concurring opinion in the 
case of Bullock v. Luke, 98 U. 501, 98 P.2d 350, stated 
the following which we submit is the controlling law 
in this case. 
" ... We must be careful not to stretch con-
tributory negligence to the point where we make 
it encumbant upon one not only to drive carefully 
himself, but to drive so carefully as always to 
be prepared for some sudden burst of negligence 
of another and be able to avoid it." 
The Court further stated: 
"If a driver has to drive his car under the 
assumption that everyone else is apt to be negli-
gent, the next step would be for him to conclude 
that he better get off the streets entirely or 
someone is likely to hit him, and abandon the 
streets to those who were just willing to take 
the chances. If, under the circumstances such 
as present in this case, where the plaintiff's right 
of way is so clear no reasonable person would 
have any doubt about it, he could not assume 
that he would be afforded his right of way, the 
only way drivers could safely proceed at an in-
tersection woudl be to resort to: 'You first my 
dear Gaston - no, after you, my dear Alphonse', 
procedure or get out and hold a conference be-
fore either could safely proceed." Id. at p. 750. 
The appellant had the right of way in this case and 
he did not have the duty to anticipate that the driver 
of the appellee' s vehicle would negligently make the 
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left turn, and as the court in the Martin v. Stephens 
(supra) case suggesed, we must avoid measuring the 
plaintiff's duty and charging him with negligence 
because he may have failed to anticipate and avert 
negligence on the part of the appellee. 
We submit that the situation in the instant case 
is similar to the situation facing the court in the case 
of Williams v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Inst., 6 
1 
U.2d 283, 312 P.2d 567 (1957) in which the court, in 
concluding its opinion, stated: 
"If one dare not go through a green light or 
along a through street if a car is stopped at the 
intersecting streets until he is sure the said car ' 
is not going to move, his right to proceed will 
have been forfeited while he waits. 
Common sense and fair play have their proper 
place, and the standard of care under existing 
circumstances must still be the rule." 
The appellant was the favored driver and as such 
could proceed into the intersection without anticipating 
any danger. As the court stated in Morris v. Christen-
sen, 11 U.2d 140, 356 P.2d 34 (1960): 
"It is the duty of a driver to observe and 
to see what there is to see so as to be able 
to exercise ordinary precaution to prevent col-
lisions such as this. This duty extends to the 
favored driver with the right of way as well as 
to the disfavored driver. But he who has the right 
of way need not anticipate sudden outbursts 
of negligence on the part of another driver. In-
16 
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I _.... 
deed it may be said that the failure to observe 
is negligence proximately contributing to the 
harm only where by observing the driver could 
have avoided or lessened the resulting harm." 
It is apparent from the foregoing authorities and 
discussion that there is no basis in the record upon 
which the court could have found the plaintiff guilty 
of travelling at an excessive speed or of failing to main-
tain a proper lookout, and that from the foregoing it 
is equally apparent that the court erred in making 
these findings. 
POINT IV 
THE WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS ENTERED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT IN CON-
FORMITY WITH THE EVIDENCE NOR 
WITH THE ORAL DECISION ANNOUNCED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT, AND AN OBVIOUS 
ERROR EXISTS IN THE RECORD IN THIS 
CASE. 
As mentioned earlier, the oral pronouncement of 
the trial judge concluded that the appellee should be 
granted judgment no cause of action because of im-
proper lookout on the part of the appellant. The written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as entered by 
the trial court state not only had the appellant been 
guilty of improper lookout, but likewise guilty of trav-
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elling at an excessive speed. Further there was no 
finding either oral or written that the alleged acts of 
speeding or improper lookout on the part of the appel-
lant was the sole and proximate cause of the accident. 
The trial court's findings and conclusions should be 
read in conjunction with the oral decision where it 
appeared from the oral decision that the finding of 
liability was based upon findings not expressed in the 
written findings of fact. See: Vacca v. Steer, 441 P.2d 1 
523 (Wash. 1968). This is likewise the rule in the 
State of California as found in Professional Fire Fight-
ers, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 32 Cal Rptr 830, 384 
P.2d 158 (1963). 
~Te submit that although the oral pronouncements 
of the trial court in announcing the judgment may 
not constitute findings of fact in and of themselves, 
they should be considered by the appellate court in re-
viewing the entire record and when properly incor-
porated in the record they should be examined to deter- ; 
mine the correctness of the conclusions upon which the 
judgment is based. See: Moree 'V. Moree, 371 P.2d 
719 (Oklahoma). In Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling 
Co., 4 U.2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956) the Utah court 1 
held that the opinion or memorandum of decision could · 
be consulted in construing findings of fact. 
The general rule in regard to erroneous findings 
is set forth in C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sect 1786, Vol 
5B, at page 47: 
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"An erroneous finding on a material fact is 
ordinarily ground for reversal and thus the find-
ing of a material fact contrary to the admission 
of the parties or the undisputed evidence .is preju-
dicial error and ground for reversal. This has 
been held to be so even though the trial court 
would not have been required to make findings 
of fact." 
And in C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sect. 1789, Vol 
5B, at page 59, it is stated: 
"Where it is apparent that there is an erro-
neous conclusion of law influencing the judg-
ment, a reversal may be required, but error in 
a conclusion of law is no grounds for reversal 
where no prejudice results to the party com-
plaining." 
Thus it appears that the general law is to the effect 
that unless this erroneous finding of fact and con-
clusion of law is prejudicial, it is generally harmless 
error. In looking for prejudicial error in this case it 
is apparent that the appellant has been adversely af-
fected. If the court had not made the erroneous finding 
of fact and conclusion of law and had based his decision 
solely upon his oral pronouncement, the point~ upon 
which the appellant would now be appealing would 
be somewhat fewer, and we would be entitled to seek 
a remand of the case for a new trial upon the basis of 
the erroneous conclusion of the court as to the improper 
lookout. As it is, we are now confronted wfth the 
burden of overcoming not only the erroneous finding 
of improper lookout, but a finding of excessive speed 
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on the part of the appellant, and lack of negligence 
on the part of the driver of the appellee' s vehicle. 
On at least one occasion, the court has rever.sed a 
trial court for inconsistencies between findings and 
conclusions. We refer to the case of Peterson v. Nielsen, 
(supra) where the court said at p.: 
"In view of the inconsistency between the find-
ings made and the conclusions reached by the ' 
trial court the case is remanded for a new trial 
on the issue as to plaintiff's right to recover." 
There is no evidence from which it can be said that 
had the appellant continued to observe the truck, he 
could have avoided the accident. In fact, the contrary 
appears; that is that the driver of the truck, Mr. Ken-
nedy, claims to have allowed one or more cars to pass ' 
through the intersection, thus it would seem only he 
could have avoided the accident. 
SUMMARY 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
erred in finding appellant negligent under the facts 
of this case, and of rendering a decision of no cause 
of action. The court further erred in refusing to grant 
appellant a new trial. 
It is respectfully submitted that the appellant is 
entitled to a reversal of the trial court's decision and 
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... 
the remanding of this matter back to the District Court 
for a new trial on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes of 
COTRO-MANES, FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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